…messages (delphix#2)

…messages (#2)

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1916061

commit b25b0b8 upstream.

With the following patches:

- btrfs: backref, only collect file extent items matching backref offset
- btrfs: backref, not adding refs from shared block when resolving normal backref
- btrfs: backref, only search backref entries from leaves of the same root

we only collect the normal data refs we want, so the imprecise upper
bound total_refs of that EXTENT_ITEM could now be changed to the count
of the normal backref entry we want to search.

Background and how the patches fit together:

Btrfs has two types of data backref.
For BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_REF_KEY type of backref, we don't have the
exact block number. Therefore, we need to call resolve_indirect_refs.
It uses btrfs_search_slot to locate the leaf block. Then
we need to walk through the leaves to search for the EXTENT_DATA items
that have disk bytenr matching the extent item (add_all_parents).

When resolving indirect refs, we could take entries that don't
belong to the backref entry we are searching for right now.
For that reason when searching backref entry, we always use total
refs of that EXTENT_ITEM rather than individual count.

For example:
item 11 key (40831553536 EXTENT_ITEM 4194304) itemoff 15460 itemsize
  extent refs 24 gen 7302 flags DATA
  shared data backref parent 394985472 count 10 #1
  extent data backref root 257 objectid 260 offset 1048576 count 3 #2
  extent data backref root 256 objectid 260 offset 65536 count 6 #3
  extent data backref root 257 objectid 260 offset 65536 count 5 #4

For example, when searching backref entry #4, we'll use total_refs
24, a very loose loop ending condition, instead of total_refs = 5.

But using total_refs = 24 is not accurate. Sometimes, we'll never find
all the refs from specific root.  As a result, the loop keeps on going
until we reach the end of that inode.

The first 3 patches, handle 3 different types refs we might encounter.
These refs do not belong to the normal backref we are searching, and
hence need to be skipped.

This patch changes the total_refs to correct number so that we could
end loop as soon as we find all the refs we want.

btrfs send uses backref to find possible clone sources, the following
is a simple test to compare the results with and without this patch:

 $ btrfs subvolume create /sub1
 $ for i in `seq 1 163840`; do
     dd if=/dev/zero of=/sub1/file bs=64K count=1 seek=$((i-1)) conv=notrunc oflag=direct
   done
 $ btrfs subvolume snapshot /sub1 /sub2
 $ for i in `seq 1 163840`; do
     dd if=/dev/zero of=/sub1/file bs=4K count=1 seek=$(((i-1)*16+10)) conv=notrunc oflag=direct
   done
 $ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /sub1 /snap1
 $ time btrfs send /snap1 | btrfs receive /volume2

Without this patch:

real 69m48.124s
user 0m50.199s
sys  70m15.600s

With this patch:

real    1m59.683s
user    0m35.421s
sys     2m42.684s

Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: ethanwu <[email protected]>
[ add patchset cover letter with background and numbers ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1918167

[ Upstream commit 3f618ab ]

When building with KASAN and LKDTM, clang may implictly generate an
asan.module_ctor function in the LKDTM rodata object. The Makefile moves
the lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing() function into .rodata by renaming the
file's .text section to .rodata, and consequently also moves the ctor
function into .rodata, leading to a boot time crash (splat below) when
the ctor is invoked by do_ctors().

Let's prevent this by marking the function as noinstr rather than
notrace, and renaming the file's .noinstr.text to .rodata. Marking the
function as noinstr will prevent tracing and kprobes, and will inhibit
any undesireable compiler instrumentation.

The ctor function (if any) will be placed in .text and will work
correctly.

Example splat before this patch is applied:

[    0.916359] Unable to handle kernel execute from non-executable memory at virtual address ffffa0006b60f5ac
[    0.922088] Mem abort info:
[    0.922828]   ESR = 0x8600000e
[    0.923635]   EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[    0.925036]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[    0.925838]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[    0.926714] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000427b3000
[    0.928489] [ffffa0006b60f5ac] pgd=000000023ffff003, p4d=000000023ffff003, pud=000000023fffe003, pmd=0068000042000f01
[    0.931330] Internal error: Oops: 8600000e [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[    0.932806] Modules linked in:
[    0.933617] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7 #2
[    0.935620] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[    0.936924] pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[    0.938609] pc : asan.module_ctor+0x0/0x14
[    0.939759] lr : do_basic_setup+0x4c/0x70
[    0.940889] sp : ffff27b600177e30
[    0.941815] x29: ffff27b600177e30 x28: 0000000000000000
[    0.943306] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
[    0.944803] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
[    0.946289] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000000
[    0.947777] x21: ffffa0006bf4a890 x20: ffffa0006befb6c0
[    0.949271] x19: ffffa0006bef9358 x18: 0000000000000068
[    0.950756] x17: fffffffffffffff8 x16: 0000000000000000
[    0.952246] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[    0.953734] x13: 00000000838a16d5 x12: 0000000000000001
[    0.955223] x11: ffff94000da74041 x10: dfffa00000000000
[    0.956715] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffffa0006b60f5ac
[    0.958199] x7 : f9f9f9f9f9f9f9f9 x6 : 000000000000003f
[    0.959683] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000
[    0.961178] x3 : ffffa0006bdc15a0 x2 : 0000000000000005
[    0.962662] x1 : 00000000000000f9 x0 : ffffa0006bef9350
[    0.964155] Call trace:
[    0.964844]  asan.module_ctor+0x0/0x14
[    0.965895]  kernel_init_freeable+0x158/0x198
[    0.967115]  kernel_init+0x14/0x19c
[    0.968104]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
[    0.969110] Code: 00000003 00000000 00000000 00000000 (00000000)
[    0.970815] ---[ end trace b5339784e20d015c ]---

Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kelsey Skunberg <[email protected]>

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1918974

[ Upstream commit eaba3b2 ]

Unprivileged user can crash kernel by using DRM_IOCTL_NOUVEAU_CHANNEL_ALLOC
ioctl. This was reported by trinity[1] fuzzer.

[   71.073906] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: crashme[1329]: channel failed to initialise, -17
[   71.081730] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0
[   71.088928] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   71.094059] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   71.099189] PGD 119590067 P4D 119590067 PUD 1054f5067 PMD 0
[   71.104842] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   71.108498] CPU: 2 PID: 1329 Comm: crashme Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6+ #2
[   71.114993] Hardware name: AMD Pike/Pike, BIOS RPK1506A 09/03/2014
[   71.121213] RIP: 0010:nouveau_abi16_ioctl_channel_alloc+0x108/0x380 [nouveau]
[   71.128339] Code: 48 89 9d f0 00 00 00 41 8b 4c 24 04 41 8b 14 24 45 31 c0 4c 8d 4b 10 48 89 ee 4c 89 f7 e8 10 11 00 00 85 c0 75 78 48 8b 43 10 <8b> 90 a0 00 00 00 41 89 54 24 08 80 7d 3d 05 0f 86 bb 01 00 00 41
[   71.147074] RSP: 0018:ffffb4a1809cfd38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   71.152526] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff98cedbaa1d20 RCX: 00000000000003bf
[   71.159651] RDX: 00000000000003be RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000030160
[   71.166774] RBP: ffff98cee776de00 R08: ffffdc0144198a08 R09: ffff98ceeefd4000
[   71.173901] R10: ffff98cee7e81780 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffb4a1809cfe08
[   71.181214] R13: ffff98cee776d000 R14: ffff98cec519e000 R15: ffff98cee776def0
[   71.188339] FS:  00007fd926250500(0000) GS:ffff98ceeac80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   71.196418] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   71.202155] CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 0000000106622000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
[   71.209297] Call Trace:
[   71.211777]  ? nouveau_abi16_ioctl_getparam+0x1f0/0x1f0 [nouveau]
[   71.218053]  drm_ioctl_kernel+0xac/0xf0 [drm]
[   71.222421]  drm_ioctl+0x211/0x3c0 [drm]
[   71.226379]  ? nouveau_abi16_ioctl_getparam+0x1f0/0x1f0 [nouveau]
[   71.232500]  nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x57/0xb0 [nouveau]
[   71.237285]  ksys_ioctl+0x86/0xc0
[   71.240595]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[   71.244340]  do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90
[   71.248110]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   71.253162] RIP: 0033:0x7fd925d4b88b
[   71.256731] Code: Bad RIP value.
[   71.259955] RSP: 002b:00007ffc743592d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[   71.267514] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fd925d4b88b
[   71.274637] RDX: 0000000000601080 RSI: 00000000c0586442 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   71.281986] RBP: 00007ffc74359340 R08: 00007fd926016ce0 R09: 00007fd926016ce0
[   71.289111] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000400620
[   71.296235] R13: 00007ffc74359420 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[   71.303361] Modules linked in: rfkill sunrpc snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core edac_mce_amd snd_hwdep kvm_amd snd_seq ccp snd_seq_device snd_pcm kvm snd_timer snd irqbypass soundcore sp5100_tco pcspkr crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel wmi_bmof joydev i2c_piix4 fam15h_power k10temp acpi_cpufreq ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg nouveau video mxm_wmi i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm broadcom bcm_phy_lib ata_generic ahci drm e1000 crc32c_intel libahci serio_raw tg3 libata firewire_ohci firewire_core wmi crc_itu_t dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[   71.365269] CR2: 00000000000000a0

simplified reproducer
---------------------------------8<----------------------------------------
/*
 * gcc -o crashme crashme.c
 * ./crashme /dev/dri/renderD128
 */

struct drm_nouveau_channel_alloc {
	uint32_t     fb_ctxdma_handle;
	uint32_t     tt_ctxdma_handle;

	int          channel;
	uint32_t     pushbuf_domains;

	/* Notifier memory */
	uint32_t     notifier_handle;

	/* DRM-enforced subchannel assignments */
	struct {
		uint32_t handle;
		uint32_t grclass;
	} subchan[8];
	uint32_t nr_subchan;
};

static struct drm_nouveau_channel_alloc channel;

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
	int fd;
	int rv;

	if (argc != 2)
		die("usage: %s <dev>", 0, argv[0]);

	if ((fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY)) == -1)
		die("open %s", errno, argv[1]);

	if (ioctl(fd, DRM_IOCTL_NOUVEAU_CHANNEL_ALLOC, &channel) == -1 &&
			errno == EACCES)
		die("ioctl %s", errno, argv[1]);

	close(fd);

	printf("PASS\n");

	return 0;
}
---------------------------------8<----------------------------------------

[1] https://github.com/kernelslacker/trinity

Fixes: eeaf06a ("drm/nouveau/svm: initial support for shared virtual memory")
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karol Herbst <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kelsey Skunberg <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1918974

[ Upstream commit 661f385 ]

During connection setup, the application may choose to zero-size inbound
and outbound READ queues, as well as the Receive queue.  This patch fixes
handling of zero-sized queues, but not prevents it.

Kamal Heib says in an initial error report:

 When running the blktests over siw the following shift-out-of-bounds is
 reported, this is happening because the passed IRD or ORD from the ulp
 could be zero which will lead to unexpected behavior when calling
 roundup_pow_of_two(), fix that by blocking zero values of ORD or IRD.

   UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13
   shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
   CPU: 20 PID: 3957 Comm: kworker/u64:13 Tainted: G S     5.10.0-rc6 #2
   Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R630/02C2CP, BIOS 2.1.5 04/11/2016
   Workqueue: iw_cm_wq cm_work_handler [iw_cm]
   Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0x99/0xcb
    ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
    __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold.11+0xb4/0xf3
    ? down_write+0x183/0x3d0
    siw_qp_modify.cold.8+0x2d/0x32 [siw]
    ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
    siw_accept+0x906/0x1b60 [siw]
    ? xa_load+0x147/0x1f0
    ? siw_connect+0x17a0/0x17a0 [siw]
    ? lock_downgrade+0x700/0x700
    ? siw_get_base_qp+0x1c2/0x340 [siw]
    ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x39/0x40
    iw_cm_accept+0x1f4/0x430 [iw_cm]
    rdma_accept+0x3fa/0xb10 [rdma_cm]
    ? check_flush_dependency+0x410/0x410
    ? cma_rep_recv+0x570/0x570 [rdma_cm]
    nvmet_rdma_queue_connect+0x1a62/0x2680 [nvmet_rdma]
    ? nvmet_rdma_alloc_cmds+0xce0/0xce0 [nvmet_rdma]
    ? lock_release+0x56e/0xcc0
    ? lock_downgrade+0x700/0x700
    ? lock_downgrade+0x700/0x700
    ? __xa_alloc_cyclic+0xef/0x350
    ? __xa_alloc+0x2d0/0x2d0
    ? rdma_restrack_add+0xbe/0x2c0 [ib_core]
    ? __ww_mutex_die+0x190/0x190
    cma_cm_event_handler+0xf2/0x500 [rdma_cm]
    iw_conn_req_handler+0x910/0xcb0 [rdma_cm]
    ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x39/0x40
    ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x150
    ? cma_ib_handler+0x8a0/0x8a0 [rdma_cm]
    ? __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.7+0xc1/0xd0
    cm_work_handler+0x121c/0x17a0 [iw_cm]
    ? iw_cm_reject+0x190/0x190 [iw_cm]
    ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x150
    process_one_work+0x8fb/0x16c0
    ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x320/0x320
    worker_thread+0x87/0xb40
    ? __kthread_parkme+0xd1/0x1a0
    ? process_one_work+0x16c0/0x16c0
    kthread+0x35f/0x430
    ? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0x180/0x180
    ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Fixes: a531975 ("rdma/siw: main include file")
Fixes: f29dd55 ("rdma/siw: queue pair methods")
Fixes: 8b6a361 ("rdma/siw: receive path")
Fixes: b9be6f1 ("rdma/siw: transmit path")
Fixes: 303ae1c ("rdma/siw: application interface")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reported-by: Kamal Heib <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bernard Metzler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kelsey Skunberg <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1918974

[ Upstream commit 429fa96 ]

The size of tx_valid_cpus was calculated under the assumption that the
numa nodes identifiers are continuous, which is not the case in all archs
as this could lead to the following panic when trying to access an invalid
tx_valid_cpus index, avoid the following panic by using nr_node_ids
instead of num_online_nodes() to allocate the tx_valid_cpus size.

   Kernel attempted to read user page (8) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
   BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000008
   Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000081b4a90
   Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
   LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
   Modules linked in: siw(+) rfkill rpcrdma ib_isert iscsi_target_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm sunrpc ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm i40iw ib_uverbs ib_core i40e ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas ipmi_powernv ibmpowernv at24 ofpart ipmi_devintf regmap_i2c ipmi_msghandler powernv_flash uio_pdrv_genirq uio mtd opal_prd zram ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops cec drm_ttm_helper ttm drm vmx_crypto aacraid drm_panel_orientation_quirks dm_mod
   CPU: 40 PID: 3279 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G        W      X --------- ---  5.11.0-0.rc4.129.eln108.ppc64le #2
   NIP:  c0080000081b4a90 LR: c0080000081b4a2c CTR: c0000000007ce1c0
   REGS: c000000027fa77b0 TRAP: 0300   Tainted: G        W      X --------- ---   (5.11.0-0.rc4.129.eln108.ppc64le)
   MSR:  9000000002009033 <SF,HV,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 44224882  XER: 00000000
   CFAR: c0000000007ce200 DAR: 0000000000000008 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
   GPR00: c0080000081b4a2c c000000027fa7a50 c0080000081c3900 0000000000000040
   GPR04: c000000002023080 c000000012e1c300 000020072ad70000 0000000000000001
   GPR08: c000000001726068 0000000000000008 0000000000000008 c0080000081b5758
   GPR12: c0000000007ce1c0 c0000007fffc3000 00000001590b1e40 0000000000000000
   GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 000000011ad68fc8 00007fffcc09c5c8
   GPR20: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000001590b2850 00000001590b1d30
   GPR24: 0000000000043d68 000000011ad67a80 000000011ad67a80 0000000000100000
   GPR28: c000000012e1c300 c0000000020271c8 0000000000000001 c0080000081bf608
   NIP [c0080000081b4a90] siw_init_cpulist+0x194/0x214 [siw]
   LR [c0080000081b4a2c] siw_init_cpulist+0x130/0x214 [siw]
   Call Trace:
   [c000000027fa7a50] [c0080000081b4a2c] siw_init_cpulist+0x130/0x214 [siw] (unreliable)
   [c000000027fa7a90] [c0080000081b4e68] siw_init_module+0x40/0x2a0 [siw]
   [c000000027fa7b30] [c0000000000124f4] do_one_initcall+0x84/0x2e0
   [c000000027fa7c00] [c000000000267ffc] do_init_module+0x7c/0x350
   [c000000027fa7c90] [c00000000026a180] __do_sys_init_module+0x210/0x250
   [c000000027fa7db0] [c0000000000387e4] system_call_exception+0x134/0x230
   [c000000027fa7e10] [c00000000000d660] system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c
   Instruction dump:
   40810044 3d420000 e8bf0000 e88a82d0 3d420000 e90a82c8 792a1f24 7cc4302a
   7d2642aa 79291f24 7d25482a 7d295214 <7d4048a8> 7d4a3b78 7d4049ad 40c2fff4

Fixes: bdcf26b ("rdma/siw: network and RDMA core interface")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kamal Heib <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bernard Metzler <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kelsey Skunberg <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1918974

[ Upstream commit c5c97ca ]

The ubsan reported the following error.  It was because sample's raw
data missed u32 padding at the end.  So it broke the alignment of the
array after it.

The raw data contains an u32 size prefix so the data size should have
an u32 padding after 8-byte aligned data.

27: Sample parsing  :util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4:
  runtime error: store to misaligned address 0x62100006b9bc for type
  '__u64' (aka 'unsigned long long'), which requires 8 byte alignment
0x62100006b9bc: note: pointer points here
  00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
              ^
    #0 0x561532a9fc96 in perf_event__synthesize_sample util/synthetic-events.c:1539:13
    #1 0x5615327f4a4f in do_test tests/sample-parsing.c:284:8
    #2 0x5615327f3f50 in test__sample_parsing tests/sample-parsing.c:381:9
    #3 0x56153279d3a1 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:424:9
    #4 0x56153279c836 in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:454:9
    #5 0x56153279b7eb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:675:4
    #6 0x56153279abf0 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:821:9
    #7 0x56153264e796 in run_builtin perf.c:312:11
    #8 0x56153264cf03 in handle_internal_command perf.c:364:8
    #9 0x56153264e47d in run_argv perf.c:408:2
    #10 0x56153264c9a9 in main perf.c:538:3
    #11 0x7f137ab6fbbc in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x38bbc)
    #12 0x561532596828 in _start ...

SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: misaligned-pointer-use
 util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4 in

Fixes: 045f8cd ("perf tests: Add a sample parsing test")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kelsey Skunberg <[email protected]>

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1923214

commit a7889c6 upstream.

afs_listxattr() lists all the available special afs xattrs (i.e. those in
the "afs.*" space), no matter what type of server we're dealing with.  But
OpenAFS servers, for example, cannot deal with some of the extra-capable
attributes that AuriStor (YFS) servers provide.  Unfortunately, the
presence of the afs.yfs.* attributes causes errors[1] for anything that
tries to read them if the server is of the wrong type.

Fix the problem by removing afs_listxattr() so that none of the special
xattrs are listed (AFS doesn't support xattrs).  It does mean, however,
that getfattr won't list them, though they can still be accessed with
getxattr() and setxattr().

This can be tested with something like:

	getfattr -d -m ".*" /afs/example.com/path/to/file

With this change, none of the afs.* attributes should be visible.

Changes:
ver #2:
 - Hide all of the afs.* xattrs, not just the ACL ones.

Fixes: ae46578 ("afs: Get YFS ACLs and information through xattrs")
Reported-by: Gaja Sophie Peters <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Gaja Sophie Peters <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-afs/2021-March/003502.html [1]
Link: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-afs/2021-March/003567.html # v1
Link: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-afs/2021-March/003573.html # v2
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1923214

commit c7de87f upstream.

[ This problem is in mainline, but only rt has the chops to be
able to detect it. ]

Lockdep reports a circular lock dependency between serv->sv_lock and
softirq_ctl.lock on system shutdown, when using a kernel built with
CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y, and a nfs mount exists.

This is due to the definition of spin_lock_bh on rt:

	local_bh_disable();
	rt_spin_lock(lock);

which forces a softirq_ctl.lock -> serv->sv_lock dependency.  This is
not a problem as long as _every_ lock of serv->sv_lock is a:

	spin_lock_bh(&serv->sv_lock);

but there is one of the form:

	spin_lock(&serv->sv_lock);

This is what is causing the circular dependency splat.  The spin_lock()
grabs the lock without first grabbing softirq_ctl.lock via local_bh_disable.
If later on in the critical region,  someone does a local_bh_disable, we
get a serv->sv_lock -> softirq_ctrl.lock dependency established.  Deadlock.

Fix is to make serv->sv_lock be locked with spin_lock_bh everywhere, no
exceptions.

[  OK  ] Stopped target NFS client services.
         Stopping Logout off all iSCSI sessions on shutdown...
         Stopping NFS server and services...
[  109.442380]
[  109.442385] ======================================================
[  109.442386] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  109.442387] 5.10.16-rt30 #1 Not tainted
[  109.442389] ------------------------------------------------------
[  109.442390] nfsd/1032 is trying to acquire lock:
[  109.442392] ffff994237617f60 ((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __local_bh_disable_ip+0xd9/0x270
[  109.442405]
[  109.442405] but task is already holding lock:
[  109.442406] ffff994245cb00b0 (&serv->sv_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: svc_close_list+0x1f/0x90
[  109.442415]
[  109.442415] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[  109.442415]
[  109.442416]
[  109.442416] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  109.442417]
[  109.442417] -> #1 (&serv->sv_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  109.442421]        rt_spin_lock+0x2b/0xc0
[  109.442428]        svc_add_new_perm_xprt+0x42/0xa0
[  109.442430]        svc_addsock+0x135/0x220
[  109.442434]        write_ports+0x4b3/0x620
[  109.442438]        nfsctl_transaction_write+0x45/0x80
[  109.442440]        vfs_write+0xff/0x420
[  109.442444]        ksys_write+0x4f/0xc0
[  109.442446]        do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[  109.442450]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  109.442454]
[  109.442454] -> #0 ((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
[  109.442457]        __lock_acquire+0x1264/0x20b0
[  109.442463]        lock_acquire+0xc2/0x400
[  109.442466]        rt_spin_lock+0x2b/0xc0
[  109.442469]        __local_bh_disable_ip+0xd9/0x270
[  109.442471]        svc_xprt_do_enqueue+0xc0/0x4d0
[  109.442474]        svc_close_list+0x60/0x90
[  109.442476]        svc_close_net+0x49/0x1a0
[  109.442478]        svc_shutdown_net+0x12/0x40
[  109.442480]        nfsd_destroy+0xc5/0x180
[  109.442482]        nfsd+0x1bc/0x270
[  109.442483]        kthread+0x194/0x1b0
[  109.442487]        ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[  109.442492]
[  109.442492] other info that might help us debug this:
[  109.442492]
[  109.442493]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  109.442493]
[  109.442493]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  109.442494]        ----                    ----
[  109.442495]   lock(&serv->sv_lock);
[  109.442496]                                lock((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock);
[  109.442498]                                lock(&serv->sv_lock);
[  109.442499]   lock((softirq_ctrl.lock).lock);
[  109.442501]
[  109.442501]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  109.442501]
[  109.442501] 3 locks held by nfsd/1032:
[  109.442503]  #0: ffffffff93b49258 (nfsd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nfsd+0x19a/0x270
[  109.442508]  #1: ffff994245cb00b0 (&serv->sv_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: svc_close_list+0x1f/0x90
[  109.442512]  #2: ffffffff93a81b20 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rt_spin_lock+0x5/0xc0
[  109.442518]
[  109.442518] stack backtrace:
[  109.442519] CPU: 0 PID: 1032 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 5.10.16-rt30 #1
[  109.442522] Hardware name: Supermicro X9DRL-3F/iF/X9DRL-3F/iF, BIOS 3.2 09/22/2015
[  109.442524] Call Trace:
[  109.442527]  dump_stack+0x77/0x97
[  109.442533]  check_noncircular+0xdc/0xf0
[  109.442546]  __lock_acquire+0x1264/0x20b0
[  109.442553]  lock_acquire+0xc2/0x400
[  109.442564]  rt_spin_lock+0x2b/0xc0
[  109.442570]  __local_bh_disable_ip+0xd9/0x270
[  109.442573]  svc_xprt_do_enqueue+0xc0/0x4d0
[  109.442577]  svc_close_list+0x60/0x90
[  109.442581]  svc_close_net+0x49/0x1a0
[  109.442585]  svc_shutdown_net+0x12/0x40
[  109.442588]  nfsd_destroy+0xc5/0x180
[  109.442590]  nfsd+0x1bc/0x270
[  109.442595]  kthread+0x194/0x1b0
[  109.442600]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[  109.518225] nfsd: last server has exited, flushing export cache
[  OK  ] Stopped NFSv4 ID-name mapping service.
[  OK  ] Stopped GSSAPI Proxy Daemon.
[  OK  ] Stopped NFS Mount Daemon.
[  OK  ] Stopped NFS status monitor for NFSv2/3 locking..

Fixes: 719f8bc ("svcrpc: fix xpt_list traversal locking on shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Joe Korty <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1923220

[ Upstream commit 4deb550 ]

label err_eni_release is reachable when eni_start() fail.
In eni_start() it calls dev->phy->start() in the last step, if start()
fail we don't need to call phy->stop(), if start() is never called, we
neither need to call phy->stop(), otherwise null-ptr-deref will happen.

In order to fix this issue, don't call phy->stop() in label err_eni_release

[    4.875714] ==================================================================
[    4.876091] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.876433] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000030 by task modprobe/95
[    4.876778]
[    4.876862] CPU: 0 PID: 95 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-00090-gdcc0b49040c7 #2
[    4.877290] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-48-gd94
[    4.877876] Call Trace:
[    4.878009]  dump_stack+0x7d/0xa3
[    4.878191]  kasan_report.cold+0x10c/0x10e
[    4.878410]  ? __slab_free+0x2f0/0x340
[    4.878612]  ? suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.878832]  suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.879043]  eni_do_release+0x3b/0x70 [eni]
[    4.879269]  eni_init_one.cold+0x1152/0x1747 [eni]
[    4.879528]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7b/0xd0
[    4.879768]  ? eni_ioctl+0x270/0x270 [eni]
[    4.879990]  ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[    4.880226]  ? eni_ioctl+0x270/0x270 [eni]
[    4.880448]  local_pci_probe+0x6f/0xb0
[    4.880650]  pci_device_probe+0x171/0x240
[    4.880864]  ? pci_device_remove+0xe0/0xe0
[    4.881086]  ? kernfs_create_link+0xb6/0x110
[    4.881315]  ? sysfs_do_create_link_sd.isra.0+0x76/0xe0
[    4.881594]  really_probe+0x161/0x420
[    4.881791]  driver_probe_device+0x6d/0xd0
[    4.882010]  device_driver_attach+0x82/0x90
[    4.882233]  ? device_driver_attach+0x90/0x90
[    4.882465]  __driver_attach+0x60/0x100
[    4.882671]  ? device_driver_attach+0x90/0x90
[    4.882903]  bus_for_each_dev+0xe1/0x140
[    4.883114]  ? subsys_dev_iter_exit+0x10/0x10
[    4.883346]  ? klist_node_init+0x61/0x80
[    4.883557]  bus_add_driver+0x254/0x2a0
[    4.883764]  driver_register+0xd3/0x150
[    4.883971]  ? 0xffffffffc0038000
[    4.884149]  do_one_initcall+0x84/0x250
[    4.884355]  ? trace_event_raw_event_initcall_finish+0x150/0x150
[    4.884674]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.884875]  ? ____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x84/0xa0
[    4.885150]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.885352]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.885557]  do_init_module+0xf8/0x350
[    4.885760]  load_module+0x3fe6/0x4340
[    4.885960]  ? vm_unmap_ram+0x1d0/0x1d0
[    4.886166]  ? ____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x84/0xa0
[    4.886441]  ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[    4.886697]  ? __do_sys_finit_module+0x108/0x170
[    4.886941]  __do_sys_finit_module+0x108/0x170
[    4.887178]  ? __ia32_sys_init_module+0x40/0x40
[    4.887419]  ? file_open_root+0x200/0x200
[    4.887634]  ? do_sys_open+0x85/0xe0
[    4.887826]  ? filp_open+0x50/0x50
[    4.888009]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x4d/0x60
[    4.888287]  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2f/0x130
[    4.888547]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[    4.888739]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[    4.889010] RIP: 0033:0x7ff62fcf1cf7
[    4.889202] Code: 48 89 57 30 48 8b 04 24 48 89 47 38 e9 1d a0 02 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f71
[    4.890172] RSP: 002b:00007ffe6644ade8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[    4.890570] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000f2ca70 RCX: 00007ff62fcf1cf7
[    4.890944] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000f2b9e0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[    4.891318] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[    4.891691] R10: 00007ff62fd55300 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000f2b9e0
[    4.892064] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000f2bdd0 R15: 0000000000000001
[    4.892439] ==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1926489

commit 90bd070 upstream.

The following deadlock is detected:

  truncate -> setattr path is waiting for pending direct IO to be done (inode->i_dio_count become zero) with inode->i_rwsem held (down_write).

  PID: 14827  TASK: ffff881686a9af80  CPU: 20  COMMAND: "ora_p005_hrltd9"
   #0  __schedule at ffffffff818667cc
   #1  schedule at ffffffff81866de6
   #2  inode_dio_wait at ffffffff812a2d04
   #3  ocfs2_setattr at ffffffffc05f322e [ocfs2]
   #4  notify_change at ffffffff812a5a09
   #5  do_truncate at ffffffff812808f5
   #6  do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.18 at ffffffff81280cf2
   #7  sys_ftruncate at ffffffff81280d8e
   #8  do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81003949
   #9  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff81a001ad

dio completion path is going to complete one direct IO (decrement
inode->i_dio_count), but before that it hung at locking inode->i_rwsem:

   #0  __schedule+700 at ffffffff818667cc
   #1  schedule+54 at ffffffff81866de6
   #2  rwsem_down_write_failed+536 at ffffffff8186aa28
   #3  call_rwsem_down_write_failed+23 at ffffffff8185a1b7
   #4  down_write+45 at ffffffff81869c9d
   #5  ocfs2_dio_end_io_write+180 at ffffffffc05d5444 [ocfs2]
   #6  ocfs2_dio_end_io+85 at ffffffffc05d5a85 [ocfs2]
   #7  dio_complete+140 at ffffffff812c873c
   #8  dio_aio_complete_work+25 at ffffffff812c89f9
   #9  process_one_work+361 at ffffffff810b1889
  #10  worker_thread+77 at ffffffff810b233d
  #11  kthread+261 at ffffffff810b7fd5
  #12  ret_from_fork+62 at ffffffff81a0035e

Thus above forms ABBA deadlock.  The same deadlock was mentioned in
upstream commit 28f5a8a ("ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock
in ocfs2_setattr()").  It seems that that commit only removed the
cluster lock (the victim of above dead lock) from the ABBA deadlock
party.

End-user visible effects: Process hang in truncate -> ocfs2_setattr path
and other processes hang at ocfs2_dio_end_io_write path.

This is to fix the deadlock itself.  It removes inode_lock() call from
dio completion path to remove the deadlock and add ip_alloc_sem lock in
setattr path to synchronize the inode modifications.

[[email protected]: remove the "had_alloc_lock" as suggested]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Gang He <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1929615

[ Upstream commit b5332a9 ]

We are not changing anything in the TCP connection state so
we should not take a write_lock but rather a read lock.

This caused a deadlock when running nvmet-tcp and nvme-tcp
on the same system, where state_change callbacks on the
host and on the controller side have causal relationship
and made lockdep report on this with blktests:

================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
5.12.0-rc3 #1 Tainted: G          I
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-R} usage.
nvme/1324 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
ffff888363151000 (clock-AF_INET){++-?}-{2:2}, at: nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
  __lock_acquire+0x79b/0x18d0
  lock_acquire+0x1ca/0x480
  _raw_write_lock_bh+0x39/0x80
  nvmet_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x170 [nvmet_tcp]
  tcp_fin+0x2a8/0x780
  tcp_data_queue+0xf94/0x1f20
  tcp_rcv_established+0x6ba/0x1f00
  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x502/0x760
  tcp_v4_rcv+0x257e/0x3430
  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x69/0x6a0
  ip_local_deliver_finish+0x1e2/0x2f0
  ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x420
  ip_rcv+0x4fb/0x6b0
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x162/0x1b0
  process_backlog+0x1ff/0x770
  __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa9/0x5c0
  net_rx_action+0x7b3/0xb30
  __do_softirq+0x1f0/0x940
  do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xd8/0x100
  ip_finish_output2+0x6b7/0x18a0
  __ip_queue_xmit+0x706/0x1aa0
  __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2068/0x2e20
  tcp_write_xmit+0xc9e/0x2bb0
  __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x92/0x310
  inet_shutdown+0x158/0x300
  __nvme_tcp_stop_queue+0x36/0x270 [nvme_tcp]
  nvme_tcp_stop_queue+0x87/0xb0 [nvme_tcp]
  nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue+0x69/0xe0 [nvme_tcp]
  nvme_do_delete_ctrl+0x100/0x10c [nvme_core]
  nvme_sysfs_delete.cold+0x8/0xd [nvme_core]
  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c7/0x460
  new_sync_write+0x36c/0x610
  vfs_write+0x5c0/0x870
  ksys_write+0xf9/0x1d0
  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
irq event stamp: 10687
hardirqs last  enabled at (10687): [<ffffffff9ec376bd>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40
hardirqs last disabled at (10686): [<ffffffff9ec374d8>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x68/0x90
softirqs last  enabled at (10684): [<ffffffff9f000608>] __do_softirq+0x608/0x940
softirqs last disabled at (10649): [<ffffffff9cdedd31>] do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(clock-AF_INET);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(clock-AF_INET);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

5 locks held by nvme/1324:
 #0: ffff8884a01fe470 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0xf9/0x1d0
 #1: ffff8886e435c090 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x216/0x460
 #2: ffff888104d90c38 (kn->active#255){++++}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_remove_self+0x22d/0x330
 #3: ffff8884634538d0 (&queue->queue_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nvme_tcp_stop_queue+0x52/0xb0 [nvme_tcp]
 #4: ffff888363150d30 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: inet_shutdown+0x59/0x300

stack backtrace:
CPU: 26 PID: 1324 Comm: nvme Tainted: G          I       5.12.0-rc3 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/06NR82, BIOS 2.10.0 11/12/2020
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x93/0xc2
 mark_lock_irq.cold+0x2c/0xb3
 ? verify_lock_unused+0x390/0x390
 ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x160/0x160
 ? lock_downgrade+0x100/0x100
 ? save_trace+0x88/0x5e0
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40
 mark_lock+0x530/0x1470
 ? mark_lock_irq+0x1d10/0x1d10
 ? enqueue_timer+0x660/0x660
 mark_usage+0x215/0x2a0
 __lock_acquire+0x79b/0x18d0
 ? tcp_schedule_loss_probe.part.0+0x38c/0x520
 lock_acquire+0x1ca/0x480
 ? nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
 ? rcu_read_unlock+0x40/0x40
 ? tcp_mtu_probe+0x1ae0/0x1ae0
 ? kmalloc_reserve+0xa0/0xa0
 ? sysfs_file_ops+0x170/0x170
 _raw_read_lock+0x3d/0xa0
 ? nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
 nvme_tcp_state_change+0x21/0x150 [nvme_tcp]
 ? sysfs_file_ops+0x170/0x170
 inet_shutdown+0x189/0x300
 __nvme_tcp_stop_queue+0x36/0x270 [nvme_tcp]
 nvme_tcp_stop_queue+0x87/0xb0 [nvme_tcp]
 nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue+0x69/0xe0 [nvme_tcp]
 nvme_do_delete_ctrl+0x100/0x10c [nvme_core]
 nvme_sysfs_delete.cold+0x8/0xd [nvme_core]
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c7/0x460
 new_sync_write+0x36c/0x610
 ? new_sync_read+0x600/0x600
 ? lock_acquire+0x1ca/0x480
 ? rcu_read_unlock+0x40/0x40
 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110
 vfs_write+0x5c0/0x870
 ksys_write+0xf9/0x1d0
 ? __ia32_sys_read+0xa0/0xa0
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0+0x198/0x340
 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x27/0x70
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Fixes: 872d26a ("nvmet-tcp: add NVMe over TCP target driver")
Reported-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1929615

[ Upstream commit bbd6f0a ]

In bnxt_rx_pkt(), the RX buffers are expected to complete in order.
If the RX consumer index indicates an out of order buffer completion,
it means we are hitting a hardware bug and the driver will abort all
remaining RX packets and reset the RX ring.  The RX consumer index
that we pass to bnxt_discard_rx() is not correct.  We should be
passing the current index (tmp_raw_cons) instead of the old index
(raw_cons).  This bug can cause us to be at the wrong index when
trying to abort the next RX packet.  It can crash like this:

 #0 [ffff9bbcdf5c39a8] machine_kexec at ffffffff9b05e007
 #1 [ffff9bbcdf5c3a00] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9b111232
 #2 [ffff9bbcdf5c3ad0] panic at ffffffff9b07d61e
 #3 [ffff9bbcdf5c3b50] oops_end at ffffffff9b030978
 #4 [ffff9bbcdf5c3b78] no_context at ffffffff9b06aaf0
 #5 [ffff9bbcdf5c3bd8] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9b06ae2e
 #6 [ffff9bbcdf5c3c28] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9b06af24
 #7 [ffff9bbcdf5c3c38] __do_page_fault at ffffffff9b06b67e
 #8 [ffff9bbcdf5c3cb0] do_page_fault at ffffffff9b06bb12
 #9 [ffff9bbcdf5c3ce0] page_fault at ffffffff9bc015c5
    [exception RIP: bnxt_rx_pkt+237]
    RIP: ffffffffc0259cdd  RSP: ffff9bbcdf5c3d98  RFLAGS: 00010213
    RAX: 000000005dd8097f  RBX: ffff9ba4cb11b7e0  RCX: ffffa923cf6e9000
    RDX: 0000000000000fff  RSI: 0000000000000627  RDI: 0000000000001000
    RBP: ffff9bbcdf5c3e60   R8: 0000000000420003   R9: 000000000000020d
    R10: ffffa923cf6ec138  R11: ffff9bbcdf5c3e83  R12: ffff9ba4d6f928c0
    R13: ffff9ba4cac28080  R14: ffff9ba4cb11b7f0  R15: ffff9ba4d5a30000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018

Fixes: a1b0e4e ("bnxt_en: Improve RX consumer index validity check.")
Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <[email protected]>

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1930474

[ Upstream commit 5bbf219 ]

An out of bounds write happens when setting the default power state.
KASAN sees this as:

[drm] radeon: 512M of GTT memory ready.
[drm] GART: num cpu pages 131072, num gpu pages 131072
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in
radeon_atombios_parse_power_table_1_3+0x1837/0x1998 [radeon]
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88810178d858 by task systemd-udevd/157

CPU: 0 PID: 157 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.12.0-E620 #50
Hardware name: eMachines        eMachines E620  /Nile       , BIOS V1.03 09/30/2008
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xa5/0xe6
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x239
 kasan_report+0x170/0x1a8
 radeon_atombios_parse_power_table_1_3+0x1837/0x1998 [radeon]
 radeon_atombios_get_power_modes+0x144/0x1888 [radeon]
 radeon_pm_init+0x1019/0x1904 [radeon]
 rs690_init+0x76e/0x84a [radeon]
 radeon_device_init+0x1c1a/0x21e5 [radeon]
 radeon_driver_load_kms+0xf5/0x30b [radeon]
 drm_dev_register+0x255/0x4a0 [drm]
 radeon_pci_probe+0x246/0x2f6 [radeon]
 pci_device_probe+0x1aa/0x294
 really_probe+0x30e/0x850
 driver_probe_device+0xe6/0x135
 device_driver_attach+0xc1/0xf8
 __driver_attach+0x13f/0x146
 bus_for_each_dev+0xfa/0x146
 bus_add_driver+0x2b3/0x447
 driver_register+0x242/0x2c1
 do_one_initcall+0x149/0x2fd
 do_init_module+0x1ae/0x573
 load_module+0x4dee/0x5cca
 __do_sys_finit_module+0xf1/0x140
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Without KASAN, this will manifest later when the kernel attempts to
allocate memory that was stomped, since it collides with the inline slab
freelist pointer:

invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 781 Comm: openrc-run.sh Tainted: G        W 5.10.12-gentoo-E620 #2
Hardware name: eMachines        eMachines E620  /Nile , BIOS V1.03       09/30/2008
RIP: 0010:kfree+0x115/0x230
Code: 89 c5 e8 75 ea ff ff 48 8b 00 0f ba e0 09 72 63 e8 1f f4 ff ff 41 89 c4 48 8b 45 00 0f ba e0 10 72 0a 48 8b 45 08 a8 01 75 02 <0f> 0b 44 89 e1 48 c7 c2 00 f0 ff ff be 06 00 00 00 48 d3 e2 48 c7
RSP: 0018:ffffb42f40267e10 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffd61280ee8d88 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 000000008010000d
RDX: 4000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffba1360b0 RDI: ffffd61280ee8d80
RBP: ffffd61280ee8d80 R08: ffffffffb91bebdf R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8fe2c1047ac8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000100
FS:  00007fe80eff6b68(0000) GS:ffff8fe339c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe80eec7bc0 CR3: 0000000038012000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 __free_fdtable+0x16/0x1f
 put_files_struct+0x81/0x9b
 do_exit+0x433/0x94d
 do_group_exit+0xa6/0xa6
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0xf/0xf
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fe80ef64bea
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7fe80ef64bc0.
RSP: 002b:00007ffdb1c47528 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fe80ef64bea
RDX: 00007fe80ef64f60 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007fe80ee2c620 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe80eff41e0
R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000024 R15: 00007fe80edf9cd0
Modules linked in: radeon(+) ath5k(+) snd_hda_codec_realtek ...

Use a valid power_state index when initializing the "flags" and "misc"
and "misc2" fields.

Bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=211537
Reported-by: Erhard F. <[email protected]>
Fixes: a48b9b4 ("drm/radeon/kms/pm: add asic specific callbacks for getting power state (v2)")
Fixes: 79daedc ("drm/radeon/kms: minor pm cleanups")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1931158

[ Upstream commit cf7b39a ]

We get a bug:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in iov_iter_revert+0x11c/0x404
lib/iov_iter.c:1139
Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000d3fb11f8 by task

CPU: 0 PID: 12582 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted
5.10.0-00843-g352c8610ccd2 #2
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:132
 show_stack+0x28/0x34 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:196
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x110/0x164 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description+0x78/0x5c8 mm/kasan/report.c:385
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:545 [inline]
 kasan_report+0x148/0x1e4 mm/kasan/report.c:562
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
 __asan_load8+0xb4/0xbc mm/kasan/generic.c:252
 iov_iter_revert+0x11c/0x404 lib/iov_iter.c:1139
 io_read fs/io_uring.c:3421 [inline]
 io_issue_sqe+0x2344/0x2d64 fs/io_uring.c:5943
 __io_queue_sqe+0x19c/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6260
 io_queue_sqe+0x2a4/0x590 fs/io_uring.c:6326
 io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6395 [inline]
 io_submit_sqes+0x4c0/0xa04 fs/io_uring.c:6624
 __do_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:9013 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:8960 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x190/0x708 fs/io_uring.c:8960
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline]
 invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline]
 el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline]
 do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:227
 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367
 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383
 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670

Allocated by task 12570:
 stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xdc/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:461
 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 mm/kasan/common.c:475
 __kmalloc+0x23c/0x334 mm/slub.c:3970
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:557 [inline]
 __io_alloc_async_data+0x68/0x9c fs/io_uring.c:3210
 io_setup_async_rw fs/io_uring.c:3229 [inline]
 io_read fs/io_uring.c:3436 [inline]
 io_issue_sqe+0x2954/0x2d64 fs/io_uring.c:5943
 __io_queue_sqe+0x19c/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6260
 io_queue_sqe+0x2a4/0x590 fs/io_uring.c:6326
 io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6395 [inline]
 io_submit_sqes+0x4c0/0xa04 fs/io_uring.c:6624
 __do_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:9013 [inline]
 __se_sys_io_uring_enter fs/io_uring.c:8960 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x190/0x708 fs/io_uring.c:8960
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline]
 invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline]
 el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline]
 do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:227
 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367
 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383
 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670

Freed by task 12570:
 stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
 kasan_set_track+0x38/0x6c mm/kasan/common.c:56
 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
 __kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:422
 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x1c mm/kasan/common.c:431
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1544 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1577 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3142 [inline]
 kfree+0x104/0x38c mm/slub.c:4124
 io_dismantle_req fs/io_uring.c:1855 [inline]
 __io_free_req+0x70/0x254 fs/io_uring.c:1867
 io_put_req_find_next fs/io_uring.c:2173 [inline]
 __io_queue_sqe+0x1fc/0x520 fs/io_uring.c:6279
 __io_req_task_submit+0x154/0x21c fs/io_uring.c:2051
 io_req_task_submit+0x2c/0x44 fs/io_uring.c:2063
 task_work_run+0xdc/0x128 kernel/task_work.c:151
 get_signal+0x6f8/0x980 kernel/signal.c:2562
 do_signal+0x108/0x3a4 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:658
 do_notify_resume+0xbc/0x25c arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:722
 work_pending+0xc/0x180

blkdev_read_iter can truncate iov_iter's count since the count + pos may
exceed the size of the blkdev. This will confuse io_read that we have
consume the iovec. And once we do the iov_iter_revert in io_read, we
will trigger the slab-out-of-bounds. Fix it by reexpand the count with
size has been truncated.

blkdev_write_iter can trigger the problem too.

Signed-off-by: yangerkun <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

…ate_pagetables'

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2110173

[ Upstream commit fddc45026311c05a5355fd34b9dc0a1d7eaef4a2 ]

This commit addresses a circular locking dependency in the
svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables function. The function previously
held a lock while determining whether to perform an unmap or eviction
operation, which could lead to deadlocks.

Fixes the below:

[  223.418794] ======================================================
[  223.418820] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  223.418845] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 Tainted: G     U     OE
[  223.418869] ------------------------------------------------------
[  223.418889] kfdtest/3939 is trying to acquire lock:
[  223.418906] ffff8957552eae38 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.419302]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  223.419303] ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu]
[  223.419447] Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25
[  223.419477] [IGT] amd_basic: executing
[  223.419599]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  223.419611]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  223.419621]
               -> #2 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  223.419636]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20
[  223.419647]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  223.419656]        svm_range_validate_and_map+0x2f1/0x15b0 [amdgpu]
[  223.419954]        svm_range_set_attr+0xe8c/0x1710 [amdgpu]
[  223.420236]        svm_ioctl+0x46/0x50 [amdgpu]
[  223.420503]        kfd_ioctl_svm+0x50/0x90 [amdgpu]
[  223.420763]        kfd_ioctl+0x409/0x6d0 [amdgpu]
[  223.421024]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0
[  223.421036]        x64_sys_call+0x1205/0x20d0
[  223.421047]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140
[  223.421056]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  223.421068]
               -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  223.421084]        __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xab/0x1560
[  223.421095]        ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90
[  223.421103]        amdgpu_amdkfd_alloc_gtt_mem+0xcc/0x2b0 [amdgpu]
[  223.421361]        add_queue_mes+0x3bc/0x440 [amdgpu]
[  223.421623]        unhalt_cpsch+0x1ae/0x240 [amdgpu]
[  223.421888]        kgd2kfd_start_sched+0x5e/0xd0 [amdgpu]
[  223.422148]        amdgpu_amdkfd_start_sched+0x3d/0x50 [amdgpu]
[  223.422414]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x132/0x270 [amdgpu]
[  223.422662]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  223.422673]        worker_thread+0x190/0x330
[  223.422682]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  223.422690]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  223.422699]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  223.422708]
               -> #0 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  223.422723]        __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810
[  223.422734]        lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  223.422742]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20
[  223.422751]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  223.422760]        evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.423025]        kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu]
[  223.423285]        kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu]
[  223.423540]        svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu]
[  223.423807]        __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250
[  223.423819]        copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0
[  223.423829]        copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0
[  223.423839]        kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0
[  223.423847]        __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90
[  223.423856]        __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30
[  223.423864]        x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0
[  223.423872]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140
[  223.423880]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  223.423891]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  223.423903] Chain exists of:
                 &dqm->lock_hidden --> reservation_ww_class_mutex --> &prange->lock

[  223.423926]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  223.423935]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  223.423942]        ----                    ----
[  223.423949]   lock(&prange->lock);
[  223.423958]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[  223.423970]                                lock(&prange->lock);
[  223.423981]   lock(&dqm->lock_hidden);
[  223.423990]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  223.423999] 5 locks held by kfdtest/3939:
[  223.424006]  #0: ffffffffb82b4fc0 (dup_mmap_sem){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: copy_process+0x1387/0x2ad0
[  223.424026]  #1: ffff89575eda81b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13a8/0x2ad0
[  223.424046]  #2: ffff89575edaf3b0 (&mm->mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13e4/0x2ad0
[  223.424066]  #3: ffffffffb82e76e0 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: copy_page_range+0x1cea/0x1ea0
[  223.424088]  #4: ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu]
[  223.424365]
               stack backtrace:
[  223.424374] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3939 Comm: kfdtest Tainted: G     U     OE      6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14
[  223.424392] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[  223.424401] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570 AORUS PRO WIFI/X570 AORUS PRO WIFI, BIOS F36a 02/16/2022
[  223.424416] Call Trace:
[  223.424423]  <TASK>
[  223.424430]  dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[  223.424441]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[  223.424449]  print_circular_bug+0x275/0x350
[  223.424460]  check_noncircular+0x157/0x170
[  223.424469]  ? __bfs+0xfd/0x2c0
[  223.424481]  __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810
[  223.424490]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.424505]  lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  223.424514]  ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.424783]  __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20
[  223.424792]  ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.425058]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.425067]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  223.425076]  ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.425339]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.425350]  mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  223.425358]  ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  223.425367]  evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.425631]  kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu]
[  223.425893]  kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu]
[  223.426156]  svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu]
[  223.426423]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426436]  __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250
[  223.426450]  copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0
[  223.426461]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426474]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426484]  ? lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  223.426494]  ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0
[  223.426502]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426510]  ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10
[  223.426519]  ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0
[  223.426528]  ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0
[  223.426537]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426550]  copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0
[  223.426569]  kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0
[  223.426577]  ? __schedule+0x4c9/0x1b00
[  223.426586]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426594]  ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10
[  223.426602]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426610]  ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0
[  223.426619]  ? schedule+0x107/0x1a0
[  223.426629]  __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90
[  223.426643]  __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30
[  223.426652]  x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0
[  223.426661]  do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140
[  223.426671]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426679]  ? common_nsleep+0x44/0x50
[  223.426690]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426698]  ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0
[  223.426709]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426717]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200
[  223.426727]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426736]  ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140
[  223.426748]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426756]  ? up_write+0x1c/0x1e0
[  223.426765]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426775]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426783]  ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0
[  223.426792]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426800]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200
[  223.426810]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426818]  ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140
[  223.426826]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200
[  223.426836]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426844]  ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140
[  223.426853]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426861]  ? irqentry_exit+0x6b/0x90
[  223.426869]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426877]  ? exc_page_fault+0xa7/0x2c0
[  223.426888]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  223.426898] RIP: 0033:0x7f46758eab57
[  223.426906] Code: ba 04 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 41 89 c0 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00
[  223.426930] RSP: 002b:00007fff5c3e5188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038
[  223.426943] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4675f8c040 RCX: 00007f46758eab57
[  223.426954] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011
[  223.426965] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  223.426975] R10: 00007f4675e81a50 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[  223.426986] R13: 00007fff5c3e5470 R14: 00007fff5c3e53e0 R15: 00007fff5c3e5410
[  223.427004]  </TASK>

v2: To resolve this issue, the allocation of the process context buffer
(`proc_ctx_bo`) has been moved from the `add_queue_mes` function to the
`pqm_create_queue` function. This change ensures that the buffer is
allocated only when the first queue for a process is created and only if
the Micro Engine Scheduler (MES) is enabled. (Felix)

v3: Fix typo s/Memory Execution Scheduler (MES)/Micro Engine Scheduler
in commit message. (Lijo)

Fixes: 438b39a ("drm/amdkfd: pause autosuspend when creating pdd")
Cc: Jesse Zhang <[email protected]>
Cc: Yunxiang Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Philip Yang <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Sierra <[email protected]>
Cc: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian König <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

…cal section

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2110173

[ Upstream commit 85b2b9c ]

A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock():

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug
  ------------------------------------------------------
  dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock:
  0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90

  but task is already holding lock:
  000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
  -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
  -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
  -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
  -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
  -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:

The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up()
while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken
by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up()
under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's
raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks
underneath it.

The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a
spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via
the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code.

  -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
         __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0
         lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630
         lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0
         _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120
         rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0
         __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830
         rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470
         rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0
         get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0
         __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520
         alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0
         alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0
         allocate_slab+0x320/0x460
         ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0
         __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60
         kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350
         fill_pool+0xf6/0x450
         debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360
         enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190
         __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0
         __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260
         hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760
         do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0
         do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160

Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate
and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled,
but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly
allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing
PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is
legitimate and not a bug.

Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still
using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the
other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup
outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are
other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or
other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in
the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache
like this.

Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2110173

[ Upstream commit 053f3ff67d7feefc75797863f3d84b47ad47086f ]

v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]>
Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2110173

commit c11bcbc0a517acf69282c8225059b2a8ac5fe628 upstream.

Currently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding
the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex.  crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock
(through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()).

On the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through
crypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory.  If the allocation
results in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex.

The above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock.  For example in the
following scenario:

(1) Task A running on CPU #1:
    crypto_alloc_acomp_node()
      Holds scomp_lock
      Enters reclaim
      Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)

(2) Task A is descheduled

(3) CPU #1 goes offline
    zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1)
      Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1))
      Calls crypto_free_acomp()
      Waits for scomp_lock

(4) Task A running on CPU #2:
      Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1
      DEADLOCK

Since there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU
acomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is
unlocked.  Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for
consistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the
future.

With this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex
held.  This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes
acomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations
before holding the mutex.

Opportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place
before the mutex dereference.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 12dcb0e ("mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chengming Zhou <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nhat Pham <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Nhat Pham <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Murphy <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2105912

When on a MANA VM hibernation is triggered, as part of hibernate_snapshot(),
mana_gd_suspend() and mana_gd_resume() are called. If during this
mana_gd_resume(), a failure occurs with HWC creation, mana_port_debugfs
pointer does not get reinitialized and ends up pointing to older,
cleaned-up dentry.
Further in the hibernation path, as part of power_down(), mana_gd_shutdown()
is triggered. This call, unaware of the failures in resume, tries to cleanup
the already cleaned up  mana_port_debugfs value and hits the following bug:

[  191.359296] mana 7870:00:00.0: Shutdown was called
[  191.359918] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098
[  191.360584] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[  191.361125] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[  191.361727] PGD 1080ea067 P4D 0
[  191.362172] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[  191.362606] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 1674 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5+ #2
[  191.363292] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/21/2024
[  191.364124] RIP: 0010:down_write+0x19/0x50
[  191.364537] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb e8 de cd ff ff 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 48 0f b1 13 75 16 65 48 8b 05 88 24 4c 6a 48 89 43 08 48 8b 5d
[  191.365867] RSP: 0000:ff45fbe0c1c037b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  191.366350] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000098 RCX: ffffff8100000000
[  191.366951] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: 0000000000000098
[  191.367600] RBP: ff45fbe0c1c037c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[  191.368225] R10: ff45fbe0d2b01000 R11: 0000000000000008 R12: 0000000000000000
[  191.368874] R13: 000000000000000b R14: ff43dc27509d67c0 R15: 0000000000000020
[  191.369549] FS:  00007dbc5001e740(0000) GS:ff43dc663f380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  191.370213] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  191.370830] CR2: 0000000000000098 CR3: 0000000168e8e002 CR4: 0000000000b73ef0
[  191.371557] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  191.372192] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  191.372906] Call Trace:
[  191.373262]  <TASK>
[  191.373621]  ? show_regs+0x64/0x70
[  191.374040]  ? __die+0x24/0x70
[  191.374468]  ? page_fault_oops+0x290/0x5b0
[  191.374875]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x448/0x800
[  191.375357]  ? exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x160
[  191.375971]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
[  191.376416]  ? down_write+0x19/0x50
[  191.376832]  ? down_write+0x12/0x50
[  191.377232]  simple_recursive_removal+0x4a/0x2a0
[  191.377679]  ? __pfx_remove_one+0x10/0x10
[  191.378088]  debugfs_remove+0x44/0x70
[  191.378530]  mana_detach+0x17c/0x4f0
[  191.378950]  ? __flush_work+0x1e2/0x3b0
[  191.379362]  ? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[  191.379787]  mana_remove+0xf2/0x1a0
[  191.380193]  mana_gd_shutdown+0x3b/0x70
[  191.380642]  pci_device_shutdown+0x3a/0x80
[  191.381063]  device_shutdown+0x13e/0x230
[  191.381480]  kernel_power_off+0x35/0x80
[  191.381890]  hibernate+0x3c6/0x470
[  191.382312]  state_store+0xcb/0xd0
[  191.382734]  kobj_attr_store+0x12/0x30
[  191.383211]  sysfs_kf_write+0x3e/0x50
[  191.383640]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x140/0x1d0
[  191.384106]  vfs_write+0x271/0x440
[  191.384521]  ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
[  191.384924]  __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x20
[  191.385313]  x64_sys_call+0x2b0/0x20b0
[  191.385736]  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x150
[  191.386146]  ? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0xe7/0x240
[  191.386676]  ? __lruvec_stat_mod_folio+0x79/0xb0
[  191.387124]  ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[  191.387515]  ? queued_spin_unlock+0x9/0x10
[  191.387937]  ? do_anonymous_page+0x33c/0xa00
[  191.388374]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0xcf3/0x1210
[  191.388805]  ? __count_memcg_events+0xbe/0x180
[  191.389235]  ? handle_mm_fault+0xae/0x300
[  191.389588]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x559/0x800
[  191.390027]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x43/0x230
[  191.390525]  ? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30
[  191.390879]  ? exc_page_fault+0x86/0x160
[  191.391235]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  191.391745] RIP: 0033:0x7dbc4ff1c574
[  191.392111] Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89
[  191.393412] RSP: 002b:00007ffd95a23ab8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[  191.393990] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007dbc4ff1c574
[  191.394594] RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 00005a6eeadb0ce0 RDI: 0000000000000001
[  191.395215] RBP: 00007ffd95a23ae0 R08: 00007dbc50003b20 R09: 0000000000000000
[  191.395805] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005
[  191.396404] R13: 00005a6eeadb0ce0 R14: 00007dbc500045c0 R15: 00007dbc50001ee0
[  191.396987]  </TASK>

To fix this, we explicitly set such mana debugfs variables to NULL after
debugfs_remove() is called.

Fixes: 6607c17 ("net: mana: Enable debugfs files for MANA device")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Shradha Gupta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1741688260-28922-1-git-send-email-shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 3e64bb2)
Signed-off-by: John Cabaj <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kuba Pawlak <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Cabaj <[email protected]>

…messages (#2)

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2105912

When on a MANA VM hibernation is triggered, as part of hibernate_snapshot(),
mana_gd_suspend() and mana_gd_resume() are called. If during this
mana_gd_resume(), a failure occurs with HWC creation, mana_port_debugfs
pointer does not get reinitialized and ends up pointing to older,
cleaned-up dentry.
Further in the hibernation path, as part of power_down(), mana_gd_shutdown()
is triggered. This call, unaware of the failures in resume, tries to cleanup
the already cleaned up  mana_port_debugfs value and hits the following bug:

[  191.359296] mana 7870:00:00.0: Shutdown was called
[  191.359918] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098
[  191.360584] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[  191.361125] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[  191.361727] PGD 1080ea067 P4D 0
[  191.362172] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[  191.362606] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 1674 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5+ #2
[  191.363292] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/21/2024
[  191.364124] RIP: 0010:down_write+0x19/0x50
[  191.364537] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb e8 de cd ff ff 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 48 0f b1 13 75 16 65 48 8b 05 88 24 4c 6a 48 89 43 08 48 8b 5d
[  191.365867] RSP: 0000:ff45fbe0c1c037b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  191.366350] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000098 RCX: ffffff8100000000
[  191.366951] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: 0000000000000098
[  191.367600] RBP: ff45fbe0c1c037c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[  191.368225] R10: ff45fbe0d2b01000 R11: 0000000000000008 R12: 0000000000000000
[  191.368874] R13: 000000000000000b R14: ff43dc27509d67c0 R15: 0000000000000020
[  191.369549] FS:  00007dbc5001e740(0000) GS:ff43dc663f380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  191.370213] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  191.370830] CR2: 0000000000000098 CR3: 0000000168e8e002 CR4: 0000000000b73ef0
[  191.371557] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  191.372192] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  191.372906] Call Trace:
[  191.373262]  <TASK>
[  191.373621]  ? show_regs+0x64/0x70
[  191.374040]  ? __die+0x24/0x70
[  191.374468]  ? page_fault_oops+0x290/0x5b0
[  191.374875]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x448/0x800
[  191.375357]  ? exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x160
[  191.375971]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
[  191.376416]  ? down_write+0x19/0x50
[  191.376832]  ? down_write+0x12/0x50
[  191.377232]  simple_recursive_removal+0x4a/0x2a0
[  191.377679]  ? __pfx_remove_one+0x10/0x10
[  191.378088]  debugfs_remove+0x44/0x70
[  191.378530]  mana_detach+0x17c/0x4f0
[  191.378950]  ? __flush_work+0x1e2/0x3b0
[  191.379362]  ? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[  191.379787]  mana_remove+0xf2/0x1a0
[  191.380193]  mana_gd_shutdown+0x3b/0x70
[  191.380642]  pci_device_shutdown+0x3a/0x80
[  191.381063]  device_shutdown+0x13e/0x230
[  191.381480]  kernel_power_off+0x35/0x80
[  191.381890]  hibernate+0x3c6/0x470
[  191.382312]  state_store+0xcb/0xd0
[  191.382734]  kobj_attr_store+0x12/0x30
[  191.383211]  sysfs_kf_write+0x3e/0x50
[  191.383640]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x140/0x1d0
[  191.384106]  vfs_write+0x271/0x440
[  191.384521]  ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
[  191.384924]  __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x20
[  191.385313]  x64_sys_call+0x2b0/0x20b0
[  191.385736]  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x150
[  191.386146]  ? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0xe7/0x240
[  191.386676]  ? __lruvec_stat_mod_folio+0x79/0xb0
[  191.387124]  ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[  191.387515]  ? queued_spin_unlock+0x9/0x10
[  191.387937]  ? do_anonymous_page+0x33c/0xa00
[  191.388374]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0xcf3/0x1210
[  191.388805]  ? __count_memcg_events+0xbe/0x180
[  191.389235]  ? handle_mm_fault+0xae/0x300
[  191.389588]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x559/0x800
[  191.390027]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x43/0x230
[  191.390525]  ? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30
[  191.390879]  ? exc_page_fault+0x86/0x160
[  191.391235]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  191.391745] RIP: 0033:0x7dbc4ff1c574
[  191.392111] Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89
[  191.393412] RSP: 002b:00007ffd95a23ab8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[  191.393990] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007dbc4ff1c574
[  191.394594] RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 00005a6eeadb0ce0 RDI: 0000000000000001
[  191.395215] RBP: 00007ffd95a23ae0 R08: 00007dbc50003b20 R09: 0000000000000000
[  191.395805] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005
[  191.396404] R13: 00005a6eeadb0ce0 R14: 00007dbc500045c0 R15: 00007dbc50001ee0
[  191.396987]  </TASK>

To fix this, we explicitly set such mana debugfs variables to NULL after
debugfs_remove() is called.

Fixes: 6607c17 ("net: mana: Enable debugfs files for MANA device")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Shradha Gupta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1741688260-28922-1-git-send-email-shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 3e64bb2)
Signed-off-by: John Cabaj <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kuba Pawlak <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Cabaj <[email protected]>

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2118807

Fix cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() to take the correct lock order
and prevent the following deadlock from happening

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.16.0-rc3-build2+ #1301 Tainted: G S      W
------------------------------------------------------
cifsd/6055 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88810ad56038 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
       __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
       lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
       cifs_setup_session+0x81/0x4b0
       cifs_get_smb_ses+0x771/0x900
       cifs_mount_get_session+0x7e/0x170
       cifs_mount+0x92/0x2d0
       cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x161/0x460
       smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90
       vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180
       do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0
       path_mount+0x6ee/0x740
       do_mount+0x98/0xe0
       __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180
       do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #1 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
       __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
       lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
       cifs_match_super+0x101/0x320
       sget+0xab/0x270
       cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e0/0x460
       smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90
       vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180
       do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0
       path_mount+0x6ee/0x740
       do_mount+0x98/0xe0
       __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180
       do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #0 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_noncircular+0x95/0xc0
       check_prev_add+0x115/0x2f0
       validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
       __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
       lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
       cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200
       __cifs_reconnect+0x8f/0x500
       cifs_handle_standard+0x112/0x280
       cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x64d/0xbc0
       kthread+0x2f7/0x310
       ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x230
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &tcp_ses->srv_lock --> &ret_buf->ses_lock --> &ret_buf->chan_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock);
                               lock(&ret_buf->ses_lock);
                               lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock);
  lock(&tcp_ses->srv_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by cifsd/6055:
 #0: ffffffff857de398 (&cifs_tcp_ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x7b/0x200
 #1: ffff888119c64060 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x9c/0x200
 #2: ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200

Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Fixes: d7d7a66 ("cifs: avoid use of global locks for high contention data")
Reviewed-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Tested-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 711741f94ac3cf9f4e3aa73aa171e76d188c0819)
Signed-off-by: Vinicius Peixoto <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alessio Faina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vinicius Peixoto <[email protected]>

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

…messages (#2)

…mage

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2120812

commit 42cb74a92adaf88061039601ddf7c874f58b554e upstream.

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9426 at fs/inode.c:417 drop_nlink+0xac/0xd0
home/cc/linux/fs/inode.c:417
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9426 Comm: syz-executor568 Not tainted
6.14.0-12627-g94d471a4f428 #2 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:drop_nlink+0xac/0xd0 home/cc/linux/fs/inode.c:417
Code: 48 8b 5d 28 be 08 00 00 00 48 8d bb 70 07 00 00 e8 f9 67 e6 ff
f0 48 ff 83 70 07 00 00 5b 5d e9 9a 12 82 ff e8 95 12 82 ff 90
<0f> 0b 90 c7 45 48 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d e9 83 12 82 ff e8 fe 5f e6
ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc900026b7c28 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8239710f
RDX: ffff888041345a00 RSI: ffffffff8239717b RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: ffff888054509ad0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff9ab36f08 R12: ffff88804bb40000
R13: ffff8880545091e0 R14: 0000000000008000 R15: ffff8880545091e0
FS:  000055555d0c5880(0000) GS:ffff8880eb3e3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f915c55b178 CR3: 0000000050d20000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
 <task>
 f2fs_i_links_write home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3194 [inline]
 f2fs_drop_nlink+0xd1/0x3c0 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/dir.c:845
 f2fs_delete_entry+0x542/0x1450 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/dir.c:909
 f2fs_unlink+0x45c/0x890 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/namei.c:581
 vfs_unlink+0x2fb/0x9b0 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4544
 do_unlinkat+0x4c5/0x6a0 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4608
 __do_sys_unlink home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4654 [inline]
 __se_sys_unlink home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4652 [inline]
 __x64_sys_unlink+0xc5/0x110 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4652
 do_syscall_x64 home/cc/linux/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x250 home/cc/linux/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fb3d092324b
Code: 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66
2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 57 00 00 00 0f 05
&lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01
48
RSP: 002b:00007ffdc232d938 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000057
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb3d092324b
RDX: 00007ffdc232d960 RSI: 00007ffdc232d960 RDI: 00007ffdc232d9f0
RBP: 00007ffdc232d9f0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffdc232d7c0
R10: 00000000fffffffd R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffdc232eaf0
R13: 000055555d0cebb0 R14: 00007ffdc232d958 R15: 0000000000000001
 </task>

Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2120812

[ Upstream commit eedf3e3c2f2af55dca42b0ea81dffb808211d269 ]

ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3

This was originally done in NetBSD:
NetBSD/src@b69d1ac
and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I
previously contributed to this repository.

This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN:
llvm/llvm-project@7926744

Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia:

  #0    0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e
  #1.2  0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #1.1  0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #1    0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #2    0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f
  #3    0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723
  #4    0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e
  #5    0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089
  #6    0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169
  #7    0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a
  #8    0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7
  #9    0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979
  #10   0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f
  #11   0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf
  #12   0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278
  #13   0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87
  #14   0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d
  #15   0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e
  #16   0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad
  #17   0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e
  #18   0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7
  #19   0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342
  #20   0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3
  #21   0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616
  #22   0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323
  #23   0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76
  #24   0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831
  #25   0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc
  #26   0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58
  #27   0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159
  #28   0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414
  #29   0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d
  #30   0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7
  #31   0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66
  #32   0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9
  #33   0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d
  #34   0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983
  #35   0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e
  #36   0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509
  #37   0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958
  #38   0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247
  #39   0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962
  #40   0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30
  #41   0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d

Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <[email protected]>
[ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2120812

[ Upstream commit 5d3bc9e5e725aa36cca9b794e340057feb6880b4 ]

This patch fixes an issue seen in a large-scale deployment under heavy
incoming pkts where the aRFS flow wrongly matches a flow and reprograms the
NIC with wrong settings. That mis-steering causes RX-path latency spikes
and noisy neighbor effects when many connections collide on the same
hash (some of our production servers have 20-30K connections).

set_rps_cpu() calls ndo_rx_flow_steer() with flow_id that is calculated by
hashing the skb sized by the per rx-queue table size. This results in
multiple connections (even across different rx-queues) getting the same
hash value. The driver steer function modifies the wrong flow to use this
rx-queue, e.g.: Flow#1 is first added:
    Flow#1:  <ip1, port1, ip2, port2>, Hash 'h', q#10

Later when a new flow needs to be added:
	    Flow#2:  <ip3, port3, ip4, port4>, Hash 'h', q#20

The driver finds the hash 'h' from Flow#1 and updates it to use q#20. This
results in both flows getting un-optimized - packets for Flow#1 goes to
q#20, and then reprogrammed back to q#10 later and so on; and Flow #2
programming is never done as Flow#1 is matched first for all misses. Many
flows may wrongly share the same hash and reprogram rules of the original
flow each with their own q#.

Tested on two 144-core servers with 16K netperf sessions for 180s. Netperf
clients are pinned to cores 0-71 sequentially (so that wrong packets on q#s
72-143 can be measured). IRQs are set 1:1 for queues -> CPUs, enable XPS,
enable aRFS (global value is 144 * rps_flow_cnt).

Test notes about results from ice_rx_flow_steer():
---------------------------------------------------
1. "Skip:" counter increments here:
    if (fltr_info->q_index == rxq_idx ||
	arfs_entry->fltr_state != ICE_ARFS_ACTIVE)
	    goto out;
2. "Add:" counter increments here:
    ret = arfs_entry->fltr_info.fltr_id;
    INIT_HLIST_NODE(&arfs_entry->list_entry);
3. "Update:" counter increments here:
    /* update the queue to forward to on an already existing flow */

Runtime comparison: original code vs with the patch for different
rps_flow_cnt values.

+-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+
| rps_flow_cnt                  |      512     |    2048      |
+-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+
| Ratio of Pkts on Good:Bad q's | 214 vs 822K  | 1.1M vs 980K |
| Avoid wrong aRFS programming  | 0 vs 310K    | 0 vs 30K     |
| CPU User                      | 216 vs 183   | 216 vs 206   |
| CPU System                    | 1441 vs 1171 | 1447 vs 1320 |
| CPU Softirq                   | 1245 vs 920  | 1238 vs 961  |
| CPU Total                     | 29 vs 22.7   | 29 vs 24.9   |
| aRFS Update                   | 533K vs 59   | 521K vs 32   |
| aRFS Skip                     | 82M vs 77M   | 7.2M vs 4.5M |
+-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+

A separate TCP_STREAM and TCP_RR with 1,4,8,16,64,128,256,512 connections
showed no performance degradation.

Some points on the patch/aRFS behavior:
1. Enabling full tuple matching ensures flows are always correctly matched,
   even with smaller hash sizes.
2. 5-6% drop in CPU utilization as the packets arrive at the correct CPUs
   and fewer calls to driver for programming on misses.
3. Larger hash tables reduces mis-steering due to more unique flow hashes,
   but still has clashes. However, with larger per-device rps_flow_cnt, old
   flows take more time to expire and new aRFS flows cannot be added if h/w
   limits are reached (rps_may_expire_flow() succeeds when 10*rps_flow_cnt
   pkts have been processed by this cpu that are not part of the flow).

Fixes: 28bf267 ("ice: Implement aRFS")
Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Rinitha S <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2120812

[ Upstream commit 10876da918fa1aec0227fb4c67647513447f53a9 ]

syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in sock_omalloc() while allocating
a CALIPSO option.  [0]

The NULL is of struct sock, which was fetched by sk_to_full_sk() in
calipso_req_setattr().

Since commit a1a5344 ("tcp: avoid two atomic ops for syncookies"),
reqsk->rsk_listener could be NULL when SYN Cookie is returned to its
client, as hinted by the leading SYN Cookie log.

Here are 3 options to fix the bug:

  1) Return 0 in calipso_req_setattr()
  2) Return an error in calipso_req_setattr()
  3) Alaways set rsk_listener

1) is no go as it bypasses LSM, but 2) effectively disables SYN Cookie
for CALIPSO.  3) is also no go as there have been many efforts to reduce
atomic ops and make TCP robust against DDoS.  See also commit 3b24d85
("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood").

As of the blamed commit, SYN Cookie already did not need refcounting,
and no one has stumbled on the bug for 9 years, so no CALIPSO user will
care about SYN Cookie.

Let's return an error in calipso_req_setattr() and calipso_req_delattr()
in the SYN Cookie case.

This can be reproduced by [1] on Fedora and now connect() of nc times out.

[0]:
TCP: request_sock_TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 12262 Comm: syz.1.2611 Not tainted 6.14.0 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:406 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_kmalloc+0x35/0x170 net/core/sock.c:2806
Code: 89 d5 41 54 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 25 e3 c6 fd e8 f0 91 e3 00 48 8d 7b 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 26 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b
RSP: 0018:ffff88811af89038 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888105266400
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88800c890000 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: 0000000000000050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810526640e
R10: ffffed1020a4cc81 R11: ffff88810526640f R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000820 R14: ffff888105266400 R15: 0000000000000050
FS:  00007f0653a07640(0000) GS:ffff88811af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f863ba096f4 CR3: 00000000163c0005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 ipv6_renew_options+0x279/0x950 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1288
 calipso_req_setattr+0x181/0x340 net/ipv6/calipso.c:1204
 calipso_req_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:597
 netlbl_req_setattr+0x18a/0x440 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1249
 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request+0x1fb/0x320 security/selinux/netlabel.c:342
 selinux_inet_conn_request+0x1eb/0x2c0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5551
 security_inet_conn_request+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4945
 tcp_v6_route_req+0x22c/0x550 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:825
 tcp_conn_request+0xec8/0x2b70 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7275
 tcp_v6_conn_request+0x1e3/0x440 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1328
 tcp_rcv_state_process+0xafa/0x52b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6781
 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x8a6/0x1a40 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1667
 tcp_v6_rcv+0x505e/0x5b50 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1904
 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x17c/0x1da0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:436
 ip6_input_finish+0x103/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:480
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ip6_input+0x13c/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491
 dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline]
 ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline]
 ip6_rcv_finish+0xb6/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ipv6_rcv+0xf9/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x12e/0x1f0 net/core/dev.c:5896
 __netif_receive_skb+0x1d/0x170 net/core/dev.c:6009
 process_backlog+0x41e/0x13b0 net/core/dev.c:6357
 __napi_poll+0xbd/0x710 net/core/dev.c:7191
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7260 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x9de/0xde0 net/core/dev.c:7382
 handle_softirqs+0x19a/0x770 kernel/softirq.c:561
 do_softirq.part.0+0x36/0x70 kernel/softirq.c:462
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 do_softirq arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:26 [inline]
 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xf1/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:389
 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
 rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0xc2a/0x3c40 net/core/dev.c:4679
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3313 [inline]
 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:523 [inline]
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:537 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0xd69/0x1f80 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:141
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output+0x5dc/0xd60 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:226
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
 ip6_output+0x24b/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:459 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ip6_xmit+0xbbc/0x20d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:366
 inet6_csk_xmit+0x39a/0x720 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:135
 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1a7b/0x3b40 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1471
 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1489 [inline]
 tcp_send_syn_data net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4059 [inline]
 tcp_connect+0x1c0c/0x4510 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4148
 tcp_v6_connect+0x156c/0x2080 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:333
 __inet_stream_connect+0x3a7/0xed0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:677
 tcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x3e2/0x710 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1039
 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x1e82/0x3570 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1091
 tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1358
 inet6_sendmsg+0xb9/0x150 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0xf4/0x2a0 net/socket.c:733
 __sys_sendto+0x29a/0x390 net/socket.c:2187
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2194 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2190 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2190
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f06553c47ed
Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f0653a06fc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f0655605fa0 RCX: 00007f06553c47ed
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 00007f065545db38 R08: 0000200000000140 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: f7384d4ea84b01bd R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f0655605fac R14: 00007f0655606038 R15: 00007f06539e7000
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:

[1]:
dnf install -y selinux-policy-targeted policycoreutils netlabel_tools procps-ng nmap-ncat
mount -t selinuxfs none /sys/fs/selinux
load_policy
netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:1
netlabelctl map del default
netlabelctl map add default address:::1 protocol:calipso,1
sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=2
nc -l ::1 80 &
nc ::1 80

Fixes: e1adea9 ("calipso: Allow request sockets to be relabelled by the lsm.")
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Reported-by: John Cheung <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAP=Rh=MvfhrGADy+-WJiftV2_WzMH4VEhEFmeT28qY+4yxNu4w@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2120812

[ Upstream commit 6aba0cb5bba6141158d5449f2cf53187b7f755f9 ]

As-per the SBI specification, an SBI remote fence operation applies
to the entire address space if either:
1) start_addr and size are both 0
2) size is equal to 2^XLEN-1

>From the above, only #1 is checked by SBI SFENCE calls so fix the
size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls to cover #2 as well.

Fixes: 13acfec ("RISC-V: KVM: Add remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests")
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2121266

[ Upstream commit 387602d8a75574fafb451b7a8215e78dfd67ee63 ]

Don't set WDM_READ flag in wdm_in_callback() for ZLP-s, otherwise when
userspace tries to poll for available data, it might - incorrectly -
believe there is something available, and when it tries to non-blocking
read it, it might get stuck in the read loop.

For example this is what glib does for non-blocking read (briefly):

  1. poll()
  2. if poll returns with non-zero, starts a read data loop:
    a. loop on poll() (EINTR disabled)
    b. if revents was set, reads data
      I. if read returns with EINTR or EAGAIN, goto 2.a.
      II. otherwise return with data

So if ZLP sets WDM_READ (#1), we expect data, and try to read it (#2).
But as that was a ZLP, and we are doing non-blocking read, wdm_read()
returns with EAGAIN (#2.b.I), so loop again, and try to read again
(#2.a.).

With glib, we might stuck in this loop forever, as EINTR is disabled
(#2.a).

Signed-off-by: Robert Hodaszi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2121266

[ Upstream commit 711741f94ac3cf9f4e3aa73aa171e76d188c0819 ]

Fix cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() to take the correct lock order
and prevent the following deadlock from happening

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.16.0-rc3-build2+ #1301 Tainted: G S      W
------------------------------------------------------
cifsd/6055 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88810ad56038 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
       __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
       lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
       cifs_setup_session+0x81/0x4b0
       cifs_get_smb_ses+0x771/0x900
       cifs_mount_get_session+0x7e/0x170
       cifs_mount+0x92/0x2d0
       cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x161/0x460
       smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90
       vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180
       do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0
       path_mount+0x6ee/0x740
       do_mount+0x98/0xe0
       __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180
       do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #1 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
       __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
       lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
       cifs_match_super+0x101/0x320
       sget+0xab/0x270
       cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e0/0x460
       smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90
       vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180
       do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0
       path_mount+0x6ee/0x740
       do_mount+0x98/0xe0
       __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180
       do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #0 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_noncircular+0x95/0xc0
       check_prev_add+0x115/0x2f0
       validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
       __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
       lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
       cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200
       __cifs_reconnect+0x8f/0x500
       cifs_handle_standard+0x112/0x280
       cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x64d/0xbc0
       kthread+0x2f7/0x310
       ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x230
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &tcp_ses->srv_lock --> &ret_buf->ses_lock --> &ret_buf->chan_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock);
                               lock(&ret_buf->ses_lock);
                               lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock);
  lock(&tcp_ses->srv_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by cifsd/6055:
 #0: ffffffff857de398 (&cifs_tcp_ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x7b/0x200
 #1: ffff888119c64060 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x9c/0x200
 #2: ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200

Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Fixes: d7d7a66 ("cifs: avoid use of global locks for high contention data")
Reviewed-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Tested-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2122072

[ Upstream commit b2beb5bb2cd90d7939e470ed4da468683f41baa3 ]

With VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER enabled, the following warning is generated
on module load:

[  324.701677] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578
[  324.701684] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1582, name: NetworkManager
[  324.701689] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
[  324.701693] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
[  324.701697] 2 locks held by NetworkManager/1582:
[  324.701702]  #0: ffffffff9f7be770 (rtnl_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x791/0x21e0
[  324.701730]  #1: ff1100216c380368 (_xmit_ETHER){....}-{2:2}, at: __dev_open+0x3f0/0x870
[  324.701749] Preemption disabled at:
[  324.701752] [<ffffffff9cd23b9d>] __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870
[  324.701765] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[  324.701771] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50FCP2SBSTD/M50FCP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C741.86B.01.01.0001.2211140926 11/14/2022
[  324.701774] Call Trace:
[  324.701777]  <TASK>
[  324.701779]  dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
[  324.701788]  ? __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870
[  324.701793]  __might_resched.cold+0x1ef/0x23d
<..>
[  324.701818]  __mutex_lock+0x113/0x1b80
<..>
[  324.701917]  idpf_ctlq_clean_sq+0xad/0x4b0 [idpf]
[  324.701935]  ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[  324.701941]  idpf_mb_clean+0x143/0x380 [idpf]
<..>
[  324.701991]  idpf_send_mb_msg+0x111/0x720 [idpf]
[  324.702009]  idpf_vc_xn_exec+0x4cc/0x990 [idpf]
[  324.702021]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0
[  324.702035]  idpf_add_del_mac_filters+0x3ed/0xb50 [idpf]
<..>
[  324.702122]  __hw_addr_sync_dev+0x1cf/0x300
[  324.702126]  ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
[  324.702134]  idpf_set_rx_mode+0x317/0x390 [idpf]
[  324.702152]  __dev_open+0x3f8/0x870
[  324.702159]  ? __pfx___dev_open+0x10/0x10
[  324.702174]  __dev_change_flags+0x443/0x650
<..>
[  324.702208]  netif_change_flags+0x80/0x160
[  324.702218]  do_setlink.isra.0+0x16a0/0x3960
<..>
[  324.702349]  rtnl_newlink+0x12fd/0x21e0

The sequence is as follows:
	rtnl_newlink()->
	__dev_change_flags()->
	__dev_open()->
	dev_set_rx_mode() - >  # disables BH and grabs "dev->addr_list_lock"
	idpf_set_rx_mode() ->  # proceed only if VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER is ON
	__dev_uc_sync() ->
	idpf_add_mac_filter ->
	idpf_add_del_mac_filters ->
	idpf_send_mb_msg() ->
	idpf_mb_clean() ->
	idpf_ctlq_clean_sq()   # mutex_lock(cq_lock)

Fix by converting cq_lock to a spinlock. All operations under the new
lock are safe except freeing the DMA memory, which may use vunmap(). Fix
by requesting a contiguous physical memory for the DMA mapping.

Fixes: a251eee ("idpf: add SRIOV support and other ndo_ops")
Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Samuel Salin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2122072

[ Upstream commit 2ed25aa7f7711f508b6120e336f05cd9d49943c0 ]

The issue arises when kzalloc() is invoked while holding umem_mutex or
any other lock acquired under umem_mutex. This is problematic because
kzalloc() can trigger fs_reclaim_aqcuire(), which may, in turn, invoke
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(). This function can lead to
mlx5_ib_invalidate_range(), which attempts to acquire umem_mutex again,
resulting in a deadlock.

The problematic flow:
             CPU0                      |              CPU1
---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------
mlx5_ib_dereg_mr()                     |
 → revoke_mr()                         |
   → mutex_lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex) |
                                       | mlx5_mkey_cache_init()
                                       |  → mutex_lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock)
                                       |  → mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked()
                                       |    → kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL)
                                       |      → fs_reclaim()
                                       |        → mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start()
                                       |          → mlx5_ib_invalidate_range()
                                       |            → mutex_lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex)
   → cache_ent_find_and_store()        |
     → mutex_lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock) |

Additionally, when kzalloc() is called from within
cache_ent_find_and_store(), we encounter the same deadlock due to
re-acquisition of umem_mutex.

Solve by releasing umem_mutex in dereg_mr() after umr_revoke_mr()
and before acquiring rb_lock. This ensures that we don't hold
umem_mutex while performing memory allocations that could trigger
the reclaim path.

This change prevents the deadlock by ensuring proper lock ordering and
avoiding holding locks during memory allocation operations that could
trigger the reclaim path.

The following lockdep warning demonstrates the deadlock:

 python3/20557 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888387542128 (&umem_odp->umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib]

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff82f6b840 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
 unmap_vmas+0x7b/0x1a0

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #3 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       fs_reclaim_acquire+0x60/0xd0
       mem_cgroup_css_alloc+0x6f/0x9b0
       cgroup_init_subsys+0xa4/0x240
       cgroup_init+0x1c8/0x510
       start_kernel+0x747/0x760
       x86_64_start_reservations+0x25/0x30
       x86_64_start_kernel+0x73/0x80
       common_startup_64+0x129/0x138

 -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       fs_reclaim_acquire+0x91/0xd0
       __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x4d/0x4c0
       mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked+0x75/0x620 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5_mkey_cache_init+0x186/0x360 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init+0x3c/0x60 [mlx5_ib]
       __mlx5_ib_add+0x4b/0x190 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5r_probe+0xd9/0x320 [mlx5_ib]
       auxiliary_bus_probe+0x42/0x70
       really_probe+0xdb/0x360
       __driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x130
       driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xb0
       __driver_attach+0xd4/0x1f0
       bus_for_each_dev+0x79/0xd0
       bus_add_driver+0xf0/0x200
       driver_register+0x6e/0xc0
       __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6a/0xc0
       do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x390
       do_init_module+0x88/0x240
       init_module_from_file+0x85/0xc0
       idempotent_init_module+0x104/0x300
       __x64_sys_finit_module+0x68/0xc0
       do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10
       __mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x6f2/0x890 [mlx5_ib]
       mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x21/0x110 [mlx5_ib]
       ib_dereg_mr_user+0x85/0x1f0 [ib_core]
       uverbs_free_mr+0x19/0x30 [ib_uverbs]
       destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x21/0x80 [ib_uverbs]
       uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x60/0x3d0 [ib_uverbs]
       uobj_destroy+0x57/0xa0 [ib_uverbs]
       ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x4d5/0x1210 [ib_uverbs]
       ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x129/0x230 [ib_uverbs]
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x596/0xaa0
       do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 -> #0 (&umem_odp->umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1826/0x2f00
       lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2e0
       __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10
       mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib]
       __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x18e/0x1f0
       unmap_vmas+0x182/0x1a0
       exit_mmap+0xf3/0x4a0
       mmput+0x3a/0x100
       do_exit+0x2b9/0xa90
       do_group_exit+0x32/0xa0
       get_signal+0xc32/0xcb0
       arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x29/0x1d0
       syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x105/0x1d0
       do_syscall_64+0x79/0x140
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

 Chain exists of:
 &dev->cache.rb_lock --> mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start -->
 &umem_odp->umem_mutex

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                        CPU1
       ----                        ----
   lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex);
                                lock(mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start);
                                lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex);
   lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

Fixes: abb604a ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix a race for an ODP MR which leads to CQE with error")
Signed-off-by: Or Har-Toov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3c8f225a8a9fade647d19b014df1172544643e4a.1750061612.git.leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

…messages (#2)